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Abstract:  
After a careful explanation of the evolution of China’s airline industry, this paper looks at 
the airfares of China Eastern Airlines on its key business routes out of Shanghai with the 
purpose of detecting any market power that it might have developed following the 2002 
airline consolidation, using a simple difference-in-differences approach. The results in 
this study do not reveal any serious market power exercised by China Eastern in 2003.  
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1. Background for China’s airline industry1 
People travelling to China or within China may be familiar with the names of Air China, 
China Southern and China Eastern, as well as the names of some smaller regional 
carriers. But not many people know that these names were created only about 20 years 
ago. Before that, they operated under the same brand name but without any real 
individual identity. Until the late 1990s most of these new airlines, which emerged from 
the monolithic Chinese government-owned carrier CAAC, had failed to establish a brand 
image and develop a favourable reputation among consumers. However, in the late 
1990s, strong competition between them surfaced as a result of deregulation of China’s 
airline markets, and each individual airline had the opportunity, and indeed faced the 
commercial necessity, to determine its own pricing policies and to design its own 
development strategies (Zhang and Round 2008). 
A striking feature of China’s airline industry is the robust growth in traffic in recent 
years, measured either by passengers carried, cargo handled, or total traffic volume. For 
example, the annual growth in passenger traffic was more than 10% from 1999 to 2005, 
except for 2003 (due to the SARS pandemic). Cargo traffic has increased more than 8% 
each year in this period, except for 2001 (probably due to the 9/11 attack in the US, 
which caused a decline worldwide).2 Nevertheless, China’s airline markets are far from 
mature. The huge population of China and its improving living standards will result in 
boom conditions for the aviation industry for the foreseeable future. 
However, from day one of the birth of these airlines, internal and external changes have 
continued, including changes in organisational structures, ownership structures, and 
regulatory policies. These have been driven and influenced by the country’s economic 
policies and the constant changes in the airline industry worldwide. The most recent 
significant extensive change was the airline consolidations that occurred in October 2002, 
resulting in the creation of three major airline groups (Air China, China Southern and 
                                                            
1 Some of the materials in Section 1 and 2 are developed based on Zhang and Round (2008, 2009). 
2 Calculated by author based on the data in China Civil Aviation Statistics (2006). 
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China Eastern). All these changes reflect the dynamic nature of the airline industry 
worldwide. 
Among the changes, relaxation of the Chinese government’s control of airfares in 1997 
might have been the most influential in shifting the way that the carriers compete. As a 
result of this deregulation, airfares in general became more flexible and cheaper, and 
more consumers were attracted to air travel. Other forms of deregulation in the last 
decade, including ownership conditions and entry to and exit from markets, have also 
brought continuous benefits to consumers, and have put significant competitive pressure 
on all carriers. However, this trend towards relatively deregulated airline markets in 
China has not been accompanied by the presence of any effective antitrust laws to govern 
the carriers’ behaviour, nor of any forceful antitrust authority to investigate potentially 
anticompetitive behaviour or mergers. The 2002 airline mergers took place without any 
antitrust challenge, and since then the major carriers have frequently engaged in collusive 
price agreements with no threat of prosecution in China’s airline markets.  
The interesting thing is that China’s airline markets have attracted the attention of many 
international major carriers, but have failed to attract the attention of academics to any 
great extent. Literature on China’s airline markets remains relatively sparse. This paper 
seeks to explore the impact of the 2002 airline consolidations on China Eastern Airlines’ 
pricing on some important business routes using the difference-in-differences approach. 
The next section will give some details about China Eastern’s history, and then we look 
at changes in market concentration on some routes out of Shanghai in Section 3. The 
difference-in-differences model is presented in Section 4 and Section 5 reports the 
regression results, followed by concluding remarks.       
2. China Eastern Airlines 
China Eastern Airlines was one of the six trunk airlines that separated from the former 
CAAC Shanghai Bureau in June 1988. Shanghai International Airport Company was 
established at the same time by hiving off the airport management function from CAAC’s 
Shanghai Bureau. China Eastern Airlines headquarters are based at Shanghai airport. The 
big three airlines were among the enterprises that were authorised to form enterprise 
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groups by the Chinese government in the early 1990s. The China Eastern Group not only 
operated businesses connected with aviation-related areas such as passenger and cargo 
services, postal delivery, ground handling services and maintenance services, but also 
non-aviation activities in import and export, real estate, advertising, financial services, 
catering and tourism. In April 1995, China Eastern Airlines was converted into a 
corporation by the restructuring of the China Eastern Group. Assets and liabilities 
relating to aviation as well as some equity interests went to China Eastern Airlines Co. 
Ltd (hereafter CEA). Its parent company, renamed Eastern Airline Group and holding the 
state-owned shares, engaged in non-airline-related businesses such as real estate 
investment and futures trading. China Eastern was publicly listed in Hong Kong, New 
York and Shanghai in 1997. 
The acquisition of China General Aviation Corporation, China Great Wall Airlines and 
Wuhan Airlines extended China Eastern’s operating areas from East China provinces to 
the northern provinces of Shanxi and Hebei and the central province of Hubei. Its 
networks, centred in Shanghai and radiating to the whole country, link China to Asia, 
Europe, North America and Australia.  
Eastern Airline Group was replaced by China Eastern Air Holding Company (hereafter, 
CEA Holdings), which was founded on 11 October 2002 after the acquisition of China 
Northwest and China Yunnan. The names of the two new members were changed to 
China Eastern Northwest Company and China Eastern Yunnan Company, respectively. 
As a result of the consolidation, CEA Holdings had total assets of 47.3 billion Chinese 
yuan (US$5.9 billion) with a fleet of 142 aircraft providing services on 386 routes (in 
October 2002). 
The ultimate goal of the consolidation was to incorporate the two acquired airlines into 
CEA, the publicly listed company. As CEA had been partly privatised, to integrate the 
assets of China Northwest and China Yunnan, it had to pay a large sum of money to its 
parent company, CEA Holdings. Therefore, within CEA Holdings, the two new members 
remained financially independent from CEA until 30 June 2005, when CEA absorbed 
their assets and liabilities after paying 986 million Chinese yuan (US$123.3 million) to its 
parent company. 
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Integration in other areas had been instituted soon after the establishment of CEA 
Holdings. At a meeting in February 2003, CEA Holdings required its members to 
implement “five unifications”: unification in aircraft deployment and network design; in 
operating manuals; in market strategy; in logo, code, services and training programs; and 
in aircraft maintenance and aircraft parts purchases (Yang and Qi 2004). From March 
2003, all domestic and international flights of the new members within CEA Holdings 
adopted CEA’s carrier code “MU”. From the beginning of 2003 individual logos on 
planes were gradually replaced by CEA’s logo. Two A300s from China Eastern 
Northwest and two CRJs from China Eastern Yunnan were deployed to the Shanghai 
market, which implied that the airlines in the group had begun to coordinate the use of 
their resources. From 8 August 2003, all three airlines jointly adopted a new frequent 
flyer program called “Eastern Miles” with joint promotion policies implemented since the 
second half of 2003 (Zhang and Round 2009).  
3. CEA’s market share in the main markets out of Shanghai    
Before looking at CEA’s market share, one issue associated with Shanghai airport must 
be clarified. Shanghai has two airports: Hongqiao and Pudong. Hongqiao has been a 
domestic-only airport since 2000, while Pudong has accommodated both domestic and 
international flights since then. In this study, I will treat the two airports as one and 
assume that they have no influence on customers’ choice. Besides considerations of 
convenience, the main reason is that it was the government that decided which flight 
should depart from which airport in the past few years and such decision changed from 
time to time subject to lobbying by the interested parties.   
 
CEA’s market share and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at Shanghai airport before and 
after the airline consolidation can be found in Table 1. These results were calculated by 
the author based on timetable for Chinese air carriers (2002–2004). Flight frequencies of 
all airlines out of an airport were used to calculate airport market share and airport HHI. 
It can be seen from the table that there was about a 10 percentage point increase in 
market share from 2002 to 2003 following the consolidation. The HHI also increased 
dramatically. In the same Table it appears that China Southern Airlines’ (CSA)’s market 
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share and HHI at its main base, Guanzhou, also increased but to a lesser extent. However, 
in general, CSA is more dominant at its base than is CEA at Shanghai, according to the 
market share variable. This suggests that other airlines also have a relatively significant 
presence at Shanghai airport, which could be a constraint on CEA’s ability to exercise 
market power. 
Table 1 Market shares of CEA and CSA and HHI at Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively   
Market Share (%) HHI  
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
CEA at 
Shanghai 
 27  36  38 1533 2209 2362 
CSA at 
Guangzhou  
 48  54  51 2701 3351 3086 
              Note: calculated by author based on airline frequencies 
We now look in Table 2 at CEA’s market shares on the ten most heavily travelled routes 
out of Shanghai. It appears that its market shares increased on most of the routes in 2003 
and 2004, but most of them are below 40%. In the same time period, the HHI on these 
routes also showed an increasing trend, but not in a dramatic way except for Xiamen. 
Given the nature of the airline industry where the presence of carriers on a route is small 
in number, these changes in market share and HHI can be said to be moderate.  
Table 2 Market share of CEA and HHI on 10 main routes out of Shanghai  
Market Share (%) HHI Shanghai 
to 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Beijing 49 41 42 3327 3391 3314 
Xiamen 23 30 56 3221 3130 4398 
Dalian 13 19 13 3938 4792 5065 
Tianjin 21 27 36 2572 2713 2722 
Guangzhou 21 27 36 2572 2713 2722 
Chengdu 8 10 21 2686 3123 3116 
Wuhan 18 39 47 3034 3493 3711 
Haikou 25 20 20 3180 3091 3107 
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Shenzhen 23 28 25 2448 3041 2593 
Chongqing 24 18 26 3358 2707 2612 
              Note: calculated by author based on number of seats offered by all airlines on a given route. 
 
4. Methodology and data for detecting market power on the three most important 
business routes  
 
Most of the heavily-travelled routes presented above have a high percentage of business 
travellers. However, for CEA and many other airlines, Shanghai to Beijing, Shanghai to 
Guangzhou and Shanghai to Shenzhen are the three most important business routes. This 
study will examine any market power effects in these three markets given their 
importance to CEA.  To detect market power, a difference-in-differences approach (DD) 
will be employed. This is an approached frequently used to examine the price effects of 
mergers by merger retrospectives (Simpson and Schmidt 2007). The rationale of this 
method is that outcomes of two groups for two time periods are observed and compared 
to elicit the impact of an exogenous impact. This approach is also known as natural 
experiment (or quasi-experiment in the psychology literature). A natural experiment 
occurs when an exogenous event such as a change in government policy leads to changes 
in the environment in which individuals, families or firms operate (Wooldridge 2006). A 
natural experiment always has a control group that is not affected by the policy change, 
but experiences some or all of the other influences that affect the treatment group that is 
believed to be affected by the policy change (Meyer 1995). When such a control group is 
present and the data are available for both before and after the policy change, the sample 
can be actually broken into four groups: the control group before the change, the control 
group after the change, the treatment group before the change and the treatment group 
after the change. Properly defining the treatment and control groups is key to the 
application of the DD approach.  In Kim and Singal (1996), a relative fare was used to 
compare the treatment group (the sample routes) with the control group (routes with 
similar distances that were not affected by the mergers) to eliminate fluctuations in fuel 
prices, changes in labour costs and seasonal or cyclical variations. The control group, or a 
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comparable group, is so called because mergers did not take place on the routes flown in 
this group.   
 
In this study, tourist routes from Shanghai to Sanya, Haikou, Wuyishan, Guilin, 
Zhangjiajie and Huangshan were chosen as control group. Tourists tend to have a more 
elastic demand than business travellers. Therefore, a low fare is expected for the markets 
in and out of these cities owing to the high ratio of leisure to business passengers. The 
fact that market power is less likely to be present on tourist routes has been confirmed in 
numerous studies for other countries (for example, see Windle and Dresner 1995 and Lee 
and Luengo-Prado 2005).  
 
The effectiveness of oligopolistic coordination also depends upon the degree of buyer 
concentration. A strong buyer can take advantage of its bargaining power to gain price 
cuts by threatening to redirect orders from one seller to another. Instead of providing a 
steady flow of small orders, buyers can break collusion by grouping them into large and 
infrequent orders to induce suppliers to deviate from their collusive strategy (Snyder 
1996). In the airline industry, travel agents can stimulate competition among airlines in 
this way.This is particularly the case in some large cities in China where a few big travel 
agents control the main sales channels and have greatly influenced the pricing strategies 
of the airlines. Although reluctant, airlines have had to grant additional commissions as 
well as deeper price cuts to these agents. Therefore, it seems to be the norm that prices on 
tourist routes are suppressed to competitive levels.  
 
This fact can also be found in China’s aviation history. In 2000 China’s aviation 
authority, CAAC, forced all the airlines to jointly set airfares on all domestic routes 
instead of competing against each other in price (for a detailed description see Zhang and 
Round 2008). As a result, all the airlines raised airfares to the published fare overnight. 
However, this was a heavy strike against the tourism industry which was especially 
important for provinces such as Hainan. Immediately tourists voted with their feet and the 
travel volume on main tourist routes fell sharply. Strong criticisms over this policy from 
consumers, airlines and local governments were overwhelming. At a time when China 
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was ready to step into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to embrace the market 
economy, CAAC’s re-regulation measure was bound to be short-lived. A mere one month 
later, CAAC allowed group discounts on tourist routes from Hainan. The policy of re-
regulating airfares was completely abandoned in 2001. This example clearly shows that 
even government-supported cartels cannot survive in the presence of very elastic demand. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the consolidation would have any market power implications 
for tourist routes and accordingly they can serve as the control group. 
 
On the contrary, for the business routes mentioned earlier where demand is relatively 
inelastic, price-fixing is likely to occur for the reason that they are the most important 
source of many airlines’ revenue. It has been revealed in other recent research by the 
author, as yet unpublished, that airlines with sales offices in Shanghai frequently engaged 
in collusive agreements, especially on the route from Shanghai to Guangzhou. 
Unfortunately, these collusive agreements were often short-lived due to the lack of 
effective enforcement measures. Given these facts, it is expected that prices on business 
routes would be higher following the airline consolidation, if market power in fact 
existed.  
 
The two time periods considered are 2002 and 2003. Although the consolidation 
agreements were formally declared on October 2002, the actual merger activities did not 
start until early 2003 as noted previously. The DD model can be expressed as  
 
airfare = β0 + β1y2003 + δ0business + δ1y2003*business + other factors + μ 
 
where airfare is CEA’s monthly average fare on a given route, and y2003 is a dummy for 
the second period, which captures aggregate factors that would cause changes in airfares 
even in the absence of the consolidation. Business is a dummy and measures the business 
route effect not due to the consolation. The interaction term 2003*business is also a 
dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment group in the second 
period.  
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The DD estimator δ1 is of interest. A positive and significant δ1 may suggest possible 
existence of market power in the treatment group (business routes) while a negative result 
may imply that market power is not serious (note we are cautious not to claim that no 
market power exists).  
 
Other factors include route Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), route distance, quarterly 
and   SARS dummies. These factors thought to influence airline pricing are included to 
reduce the error variance and to control for factors that might have been systematically 
different in 2003 than in 2002 following Kiel and McClain (1995). 
 
Airfare data for the business routes and tourist routes come from CEA’s financial 
department statistics. The average airfare is calculated as the monthly airfare revenue on 
a given route divided by the number of passengers carried. Taxes are excluded. Owing to 
the unavailability of traffic data for all the airlines, the route market share has to be 
calculated with the available seat numbers by checking the timetables for Chinese carriers 
for the frequency of each airline and the type of aircraft used for each flight. This was 
also the method used by Lijesen, Rietveld and Nijkamp (2004), who studied European 
airline markets where output measures were not available on a route level.  In fact, some 
studies have found that using either the number of flights or the number of passengers in 
a market as a basis for market concentration calculation generates similar results (see 
Bailey, Graham and Kaplan 1985; Borenstein 1991 and Stavins 1996). The use of 
capacity to construct market share can also be justified in the case where load factors are 
roughly equal for all the carriers present on a route. My interview with the sales managers 
of the big airlines in China confirmed that the seats available on each airline should 
reflect their share of the market. Based on the market shares calculated above, the HHI 
for each route can be computed by the sum of the squares of the shares of each firm in the 
market.  
 
The distance of a flight route can be found in China Civil Aviation Statistics (2004). 
Quarterly dummies are also included, with the first quarter being the benchmark season. 
  11
Prices in the SARS period (May and June 2003) were extremely high because all 
businesses and individuals cancelled unnecessary travel. 
 
5. Estimation results   
The descriptive statistics for the main variables in the regression can be found in Table 3. 
The average airfares in 2002 and 2003 for treatment group and control group are reported 
in Table 4. It can be seen that the prices on business routes dropped significantly by 52 
yuan while little change occurred on tourist routes.  
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the main variables.  
Variable  Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Fare 805 627.78 192.85 111.02 1243.87 
business 972 0.11 0.314 0 1 
y2003 972 0.33 0.47 0 1 
y2003business 972 0.04 0.19 0 1 
routehhi 
972 4813.59 2368.76 0 10000 
distance  
972 1208.22 536.84 260 2270 
SARS dummy 
972 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
Table 4 Average fares in 2002 and 2003. 
 2002 2003 Change  t value  
Business routes 
(treatment 
group) 
839.1 786.7 -52.3 -2.94 
Tourist routes 
(control group)  
607.6 609.6 2.1 0.11 
 
Although this might be indicative of the non-existence of any serious market power 
problems, the single-difference might mask the true effect of airline consolidation as 
many other forces can affect the outcome of interest. We now switch to the regression 
results for the DD model in Table 5. To accommodate the potential heteroskadasticity 
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problem, the robust standard error was reported.3 The coefficient of the interaction term 
is statistically significant, suggesting a significant drop in prices on business routes by an 
average amount of 84 yuan in 2003 following the airline consolidation. This is consistent 
with the general findings by Zhang and Round (2009) who systematically examined the 
price effects of the 2002 mergers using a different approach with large samples.  The 
results also show that business route airfare is much higher than that on tourist routes on 
average, even in 2002. The coefficient of year 2003 dummy is insignificant, meaning no 
obvious change in price on all the routes from 2002 to 2003. 
 
The coefficients on some of the other variables provide interesting results. For example, 
the negative sign of route concentration is consistent with the finding of Evans and 
Kessides (1991), showing a weak relationship between route concentration and airfares, 
i.e., route-level dominance does not confer much market power on the airlines. During 
the SARS period prices were extremely high as the airlines understood the inelastic 
demand of those who had to travel during this unusual time when most other travelers 
cancelled their travel. The results also show the airfares in the fourth quarter were 
significantly lower, which is contradictory to the western world where the Christmas 
season usually pushes up airfares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 Other model specifications, such as using log form and using yields (fares divided by route distance) 
instead of using absolute fares  for the dependent variable were tried, but there was no obvious model fit 
improvement. In fact, the signs of all the variables remain the same in different model specifications.    
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   Table 5 DD model regression results  
Variable Coefficient  Robust standard error  
Constant  362.8*** 22.81 
business 227.5*** 14.14 
y2003 -9.5 9.22 
y2003business -83.9*** 22.81 
routehhi -0.008*** 0.002 
distance  0.28*** 0.01 
SARS dummy 157.8*** 29.76 
Q2 -9.7 12.14 
Q3 -19.3* 11.60 
Q4 -28.5** 11.36 
observations 805 
Adjusted R2 0.66 
***significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. 
6. Concluding remarks   
It appears that the 2002 airline consolidation for CEA did not confer on it significant 
market power to raise its prices. The finding in this study can largely dismiss concerns 
about the anti-competitive effect of the consolidation, at least in the short run. The 
significant presence of most major airlines in Shanghai might have contributed to this 
result. Shanghai is China’s largest commercial city and the routes in and out of Shanghai 
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are a significant source of revenue for many domestic airlines. It is not surprising that 
many airlines have continuously increased frequencies and opened up new routes to this 
city. As a result, although headquartered in Shanghai, CEA does not command absolute 
dominance at its base. In this context, the airfares on the three business routes showed a 
declining trend following the airline consolidation, suggesting evidence of strong 
competition. The fact that CEA did not acquire any significant market power may partly 
explain its poor financial performance in the last few years (the worst of the big three). 
Instead, in the years following the consolidation, competition on many routes involving 
the Shanghai market remained strong, and price wars broke out regularly on many of 
them. There have been frequent calls in recent years for a merger between CEA and 
Shanghai Airlines to improve CEA’s competitiveness. 
Route concentration variables were found to be statistically significant with a negative 
sign. However, the magnitudes were rather small in commercial terms. This might 
provide the evidence that contestable markets theory still holds to some extent in the 
airline industry. Apart from actual competitors, any potential entrants that coveted the 
Shanghai market could become effective competitors whose entry subsequently 
constrained the prices that CEA could charge. 
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